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Gregory Moore's Nietzsche, Biology and Metaphor explores 
the influence of nineteenth-century biological thought, represented 
by Charles Darwin and his followers, on the philosophy of Friedrich 
Nietzsche. Nietzsche's use of the vocabulary of biology is appar-
ent even to a casual reader, and yet his biological theories are 
largely incompatible with the theories of Darwin. Moore argues 
that Nietzsche ultimately remained unable to emancipate himself 
from the predominant biological theories of his day. By illuminating 
this point, Moore's work highlights a central tension between 
Nietzsche and Darwin: Nietzsche deliberately distanced himself 
from the adherents of Darwin and deeply resented those people 
who sought to confirm Darwin's ideas in Nietzche's writings. Yet, 
Nietzche remained dependent on the biological argument to de-
velop his philosophy. In fact, Moore argues, "The central project of 
[Nietzsche's] later thought—the much-vaunted 'transvaluation of 
all values'—rests precisely upon an appeal to the explanatory power 
of a newly confident biology to demonstrate the inferiority of pre-
vailing ideals and to overturn them" (p. 3). In exploring the tension 
between Nietzsche and this intellectual tradition, Moore relates 
that Nietzsche, the philosopher who sought endlessly to transcend 
his own timeliness, remained rooted in the prevailing ideas of his 
time. Moore is an articulate writer who commands his reader's 
attention with clear prose and a superior grasp of the intricacies of 
Nietzsche's philosophy. Moore opens the book with a discussion of 
the conceptual shift in Europe following the publication of Darwin's 
Origin of the Species. The first section, "Evolution," assesses 
Nietzsche's interpretation and critique of Darwin. Nietzsche posi-
tions himself largely in opposition to Darwin. Moore here takes the 
opportunity to criticize the deficient, piecemeal reading of Darwin 
in vogue among intellectuals in the late nineteenth century, some-
thing that Nietzsche unwittingly perpetuates. Moore examines, in 
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Chapter 1, the three primary aspects of Darwin's thought that 
Nietzsche attacks. First, Nietzsche disagrees with Darwin's teleo-
logical view of nature, a stance that Moore shows to be wrought 
with tension for the philosopher. Second, Nietzsche criticizes 
Darwin's theory of the organism as a united, composite being. 
Rejecting this harmonious picture, he argues that the organism is, 
in fact, an amalgam of disparate parts, each in competition with the 
others because he "envisages life itself—the will to power—as a 
struggle of unequal parts . . . According to Nietzsche, there is not 
only a struggle for existence; existence is itself an incessant struggle" 
(p. 46). And finally, Moore notes, Nietzsche rejects the Darwinian 
theory of self-preservation. In contrast to Darwin's passive notion 
of the struggle for survival, Nietzsche envisions the will to power 
as an active, driving force, through which the individual strives to 
increase its life and power. 
The subsequent chapters in part 1 examine the way that 
Nietzsche's ambiguous position in relation to evolutionary biology 
shaped the development of his mature philosophy. Although 
Nietzsche refuses to align himself with Darwinian theories of evo-
lutionary biology, he leans on them to explicate his own philosophy, 
developing, at times, his ideas in contradistinction to the figures 
whom he is attacking. Moore cites Nietzsche's moral theory as an 
instance. Nietzsche, argues Moore, unfolds his moral theory using 
Herbert Spencer as a foil, "effectively turn[ing] on its head the 
British philosopher's conviction that evolution tends toward the 
refinement of altruistic impulses" (p. 62). Additionally, Chapter 3, 
"The Physiology of Art," demonstrates how Nietzsche's writings 
coalesce with the nineteenth-century inclination, seen in Konrad 
Lange and later in Ernst Haeckel, to locate the purpose of art in 
biology. Nietzsche envisages evolution as an artistic process-a pro-
cess that inspires humankind to perpetuate humankind by trigger-
ing innate desires to reproduce and to expand. 
The second part of the work, "Degeneration," examines 
Nietzsche's use of the theme of "the decadent modern age". In 
the "nervous age" of the nineteenth century, people outside of 
society's norms came to be seen as degenerates who threatened 
the stability of the society at large-and Nietzsche, Moore shows, 
shares in the fears of his age and exploits these fears to achieve 
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his philosophical ends. This is particularly evident in Nietzche's 
utilization of evolutionary biology to attack Christian morality. 
Nietzsche "subverts and ironises the discourse of degeneration so 
that it becomes his chief rhetorical weapon in his struggle against 
modernity and the movement in which, according to his genealogy, 
modern values have their origin: Christianity (p. 138)." Nietzsche 
finds, in the nervousness of his age, the product of Christianity's 
rejection of worldly existence and cultivation of compassion and 
therefore orients his argument against Christian morality by lean-
ing on the precepts of evolutionary biology. 
Within this discussion of the critique of Christian religion, 
Moore's analysis of Nietzsche's opinion of the Jewish people, ex-
amined in relation to those of his contemporaries, constitutes one 
of the most enlightening and intriguing sections of the work. Evolu-
tionary theories of the Jews became commonplace in the late nine-
teenth century. As Moore details, Richard Wagner drew on evolu-
tionary theories to support the belief in the superiority of the Aryan 
race over the Jewish people. Moore details how Nietzsche twists 
and turns Wagner's own biologistic argument for the inferiority of 
the Jewish people in order to distance himself from Wagner. 
Nietzsche rejects Wagner's idealized "Aryan" Christianity (—pur-
portedly purged of its Jewish influences—) by arguing that both 
Judaism and Christianity stem from the same diseased source. 
Conflating Christianity and Judaism, Nietzsche undercuts Wagner's 
own anti-Semitic argument by way of "an inversion of contempo-
rary tropes associated with Jews (p. 164)." In his Case of Wagner, 
moreover, Nietzsche employs these tropes against the composer 
himself, characterizing Wagner as an archetypal nervous individual 
and, interconnected with this, suggesting that Wagner himself may 
be of Jewish descent. Evolutionary biology represented for 
Nietzsche a potent means with which to realize his personal agenda 
and to affirm his philosophical ideals. Moore concludes his book 
with a brief survey of the scholarly reception and interpretation of 
Nietzsche's biologistic argument. 
Touching on Max Scheler, Oswald Spengler, Georg Simmel, 
Theodor Lessing, and others, the final chapter demonstrates the 
myriad ways in which Nietzsche's ideas were inherited and uti-
lized—and, in discussing the intellectuals leading up to the period 
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of the German Third Reich, Moore ends the book by establishing 
the broad significance of his study: "To recognize," he writes, "that 
biologism is a significant thread running through the fabric of much 
post-Nietzschean German thought. . . prevents us from making 
the rash and unhistorical attempt to trace a direct line of descent 
from Nietzsche's philosophy to National Socialism simply on the 
basis that both are couched in the same language of evolution and 
degeneration" (p. 211). Moore's correction of this common mis-
conception is itself a noteworthy contribution to scholarship. 
One shortcoming of Moore's work, however, is the author's 
reluctance to address the ways that the work's subject matter could 
have relevance for contemporary debates in biology and philoso-
phy. The book is narrowly focused on an aspect of Nietzsche schol-
arship that has not received adequate treatment, but it must be 
acknowledged that Moore does a superior job. The substantive 
value of this book lies in Moore's ability to reveal how Nietzsche 
rejected evolutionary biology and how he remained confined within 
it. Although Nietzsche disagreed with his predecessors and con-
temporaries about the veracity of Darwin's theory, the philosopher 
remained unable to emancipate himself completely from the grasp 
of this theory. Nietzsche's biologism "functions as a unifying frame-
work connecting and supporting the major themes of his thought" 
(p. 194), such as his aesthetics and moral theory, and therefore is 
inextricably embedded within his philosophy. As a result, the rela-
tion of Nietzsche's philosophy to the evolutionary theories that he 
encountered is one of tension and ambiguity. In revealing the dual 
aspects—positive and negative—in which Nietzsche is influenced 
by Darwin's theories, this book reveals an aspect of Nietzsche's 
thought that has largely gone unnoticed, and raises questions to be 
answered by future scholarship. An insightful and thought-provok-
ing contribution, Moore's book will appeal to scholars of Nietzsche, 
history of science, and those interested in German intellectual his-
tory. 
Jackson Taylor Kirklin 
University of Chicago 
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Given the stereotypical two-party system that has developed 
in Western philosophy over the course of the past century, it has 
indeed become difficult to find a common discourse on logic be-
tween the two camps. One is reminded of exchanges between 
Husserl and Frege nearly 100 years ago. It would indeed prove 
quite difficult to convince a contemporary philosopher of logic that, 
of all people, Martin Heidegger, Camap's favorite target of dis-
dain, could contribute something to the philosophy of logic. Yet, in 
many ways, this is what Daniel Dahlstrom attempts to do in 
Heidegger's Concept of Truth. Dahlstrom evaluates Heidegger's 
engagement with logic to be a "philosophical logic" that "distin-
guishes itself in not taking formal logic and the possibility of the 
truth or falsity of premises for granted" (3). In total harmony with 
his philosophical method in the period surrounding the construction 
of Being and Time and the Marburg lectures, Heidegger's philo-
sophical logic is concerned with finding the conditions for which 
logic is possible. In other words, despite his never using the term, 
Heidegger sought to develop that which one calls a 'transcenden-
tal logic'. 
Heidegger's critique of and response to (what Dahlstrom 
deems) the "logical prejudice" provides the overarching theme of 
the book. Dahlstrom characterizes the logical prejudice as "a cer-
tain way of speaking and thinking about truth or, equivalently, a 
theory of suitable uses of 'truth' and its cognates that is tradition-
ally construed as a cornerstone of logic" (xvi). Heidegger's Con-
cept of Truth is an explication of Heidegger's contention that logic, 
as it has been traditionally constructed, presupposes certain beliefs 
which prohibit a proper comprehension and clarification of truth. 
In fact, it is the logical prejudice that Heidegger sees as comple-
mentary to philosophy's ontological misapprehension (—its 
"forgottenness of being"). As Dahlstrom makes clear, "[t]he main 
objective of the following study is to elaborate Heidegger's early 
conception of truth (formulated in the Marburg lectures and in Being 
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and Time) as it proceeds from his critique of a particular history of 
the logical prejudice" (xviii). 
During the period of the formation of Being and Time and his 
Marburg lectures, Heidegger produced detailed commentaries on 
the analyses of truth provided by Hermann Lotze, Edmund Husserl, 
and Aristotle. Dahlstrom constructs Heidegger's Concept of Truth 
so that each of the first three chapters addresses Heidegger's 
analysis of these figures. In chapter one, Dahlstrom illustrates how 
Heidegger blamed Lotze for giving the paradigmatic expression of 
the logical prejudice. Lotze provided for the 19th Century entrench-
ment of the prejudice in neo-Kantian circles. In addition, chapter 
one even places Heidegger's account of truth within the milieu of 
analytic discourse: ". . . performative and pragmatic theories of 
truth come much closer to Heidegger's approach to the question 
of truth than do redundancy and semantic conceptions" (28). How-
ever, "the pragmatic turn is no less oriented than those other theo-
ries of truth toward the assertion or judgment as the terminus a 
quo et ad quern for the determination of truth" (as detailed in 
chapter four, for Heidegger, the primary nature of truth is 
disclosedness). Chapter two presents Heidegger's appraisal of 
Edmund Husserl who, according to Heidegger, has an insight into 
the limitations of the prejudice, yet never finds a way to move 
beyond it. And chapter three paints Aristotle as the culprit respon-
sible for introducing the prejudice, yet also the first philosopher to 
provide hints for how to overcome it. 
Of these three chapters, the one on Husserl is the most intrigu-
ing. I find much value in Dahlstrom's defense of Husserl's project, 
especially in his identifying the "ways in which Heidegger's basic 
criticisms of Husserl's phenomenology, while not unfounded or 
without merit, nevertheless remain seriously and, indeed, suspi-
ciously wanting" (53). Dahlstrom's case is built on Heidegger's 
ignoring Husserl's distinction between objectifying and non-objec-
tifying acts, misunderstanding Husserl's use of'state of affairs' in 
the first concept of truth in the Logical Investigations, and re-
maining equally obscure in his own presentation of truth in the 
nonrelational acts. Dahlstrom points out that Heidegger's concep-
tion of the timeliness that constitutes being-in-the-world is antici-
pated by Husserl's analyses of time-consciousness alongside the 
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prereflective and kinesthetic constitution of experience. Despite 
Husserl's genuine breakthrough in introducing the notions of inten-
tionality, categorical intuition, and the original sense of the a priori, 
Heidegger sees Husserl as orienting his analysis of these three 
notions in a way that remains within the assumptions of the logical 
prejudice. 
Dahlstrom's defense of Husserl against Heidegger's critiques 
is indeed quite helpful for the neophyte phenomenologist to under-
stand the various interpretations of Husserlian and Heideggerian 
phenomenological approaches. Dahlstrom states that Heidegger's 
so-called 'radicalization of Husserl's approach' is "a shift in the 
center of gravity, a shift that becomes even more pronounced in 
Heidegger's later thinking" (170) rather than a complete rejection 
of the Husserlian project. The early Husserl takes truth to be the 
identity of what is meant and what is given. Heidegger moves the 
analysis away from an emphasis on the absence and presence of 
what is meant and given to the unfolding of that presence from its 
absence. In this way, Heidegger's emphasis on disclosedness al-
lows for a notion of being that is not identified with presence. But 
as all good Husserlians know, such ideas were not completely ab-
sent in Husserl (e.g. internal time-consciousness, and later on, the 
lifeworld). Dahlstrom correctly asserts: "...it would seem that the 
sum of the discrepancies between Husserl's and Heidegger's phe-
nomenological conception of truth speaks for their continuity and 
by no means the necessity of some fissure between them" (173). 
In other words, the two approaches can be seen, as Dahlstrom 
effectively argues, as complementary; while Husserl is concerned 
with a formal ontology and Heidegger with that of a fundamental 
ontology, neither project cancels the other. In summarizing one 
possibility for why Heidegger sought to criticize his mentor, 
Dahlstrom offers a quite intriguing proposition: 
This is not the first time an ex-seminarian from southwestern 
Germany displays an uncanny capacity of assimilating and criti-
cizing in a single stroke the work of a philosophical mentor who 
is more at home with epistemological issues in science than with 
the passionate reflections of questioning believers.... To the 
question of why Kant's transcendental phenomenology becomes 
66 AUSLEGUNG 
transformed into Hegel's metaphysics and to the question of 
why Husserl's transcendental phenomenology becomes trans-
formed into Heidegger's fundamental ontology, there is a single, 
truncated, but no less true answer: religion. (173-174) 
Dahlstrom portrays a Heidegger that is concerned with the phe-
nomena of human experiences in a way reminiscent of those 
cloaked in religious faith. Such a concern leads him to construct a 
philosophy that can deal with such phenomena analytically. As 
Dahlstrom claims in the final chapter, "theology's relation to belief 
and philosophy's relation to existence are homologous in 
[Heidegger's] account.... Just as theology is the ontic science of 
what is revealed in Christian belief and makes it possible ('the 
Crucified God'), so fundamental ontology is the ontological investi-
gation of what is disclosed in being-here [i.e. Dasein] and makes it 
possible (time)" (440-441). 
Chapter four summarizes Heidegger's description of "existen-
tial truth," i.e. the original disclosure of the senses of da in Da-
sein—the "(t)here" of "being-(t)here" (it is worth noting Dahlstrom's 
strict translation of all Heideggerian terms—Dasein is always "be-
ing-here," existentiell as "existentiel," etc.). Such truth, as it is 
presented in Being and Time and the Marburg lectures, is the 
disclosure of time as the sense of being-(t)here. By re-evaluating 
the way in which truth is to be understood, Heidegger provides a 
new critique of the logical prejudice; one in which the question of 
being is not forgotten. Dahlstrom simplifies Heidegger's concept 
of truth into a five-step argument (a quite un-Heideggerian move, 
yet helpful for many philosophers), the first three of which argue 
for the three structures that constitute the way that Dasein (we) 
exists and discloses itself as being-in-the-world, the fourth of which 
argues that a sort of timeliness constitutes the sense of Dasein as 
the disclosure of the sense of being, and the fifth of which states 
that we must discover the most primitive meaning of "timeliness." 
Hence, Heidegger's profound contribution to the philosophy of logic 
is the argument for time as a "formal indication" which guides the 
nonobjectifying language of Heidegger's fundamental ontology. The 
importance of the formal indication is its role in producing the primi-
tive experience of being which makes it possible to uncover enti-
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ties in whatever way is appropriate to them. After filling out this 
five-step argument throughout chapter four, Dahlstrom concludes 
by presenting an argument for Heidegger's everyday notion of 
time, as it is derived from the alleged necessity of ecstatic-horizonal 
timeliness, in a quite "analytic-friendly" (and admittedly un-
Heideggerian) fashion, i.e. equipped with numbered premises, con-
clusions, and conditionals. 
As a segue into his critiques of Heidegger in the fifth and final 
chapter, Dahlstrom utilizes the critique of Heidegger's existential 
truth, advanced by Ernst Tugendhat. This critique charges 
Heidegger with destroying the primary significance of the very 
concept "truth" by equivocating the term with the mere display of 
things (as opposed to the display of things "as they are"). In this 
way, Tugendhat's critique is presented as a defense of the logical 
prejudice in spite of Heidegger's attack against it. Dahlstrom sees 
Tugendhat's criticism as useful in pointing out a problem in 
Heidegger's fundamental ontology, and not in defeating Heidegger's 
position (particularly because he fails to properly address the tran-
scendental character of Heidegger's concept of truth: transcen-
dental/primordial truth as disclosedness does not cancel out the 
critical function of truth in propositions—it is meant to found it). A 
seeming problem in Heidegger's fundamental ontology that is ex-
ploited by Dahlstrom is the issue of its status as science: 
"...Heidegger portrays philosophy as the 'objectification of being 
as temporal or, better, transcendental science, ontology'. Yet is any 
objectification of the sense of being possible or appropriate? Is not 
the very sense of being, the ecstatic-horizonal timeliness, radically 
at odds with any objectification?" (433). Objectification can only 
properly occur if an entity is capable of being present-at-hand. 
Heidegger attacks the logical prejudice because it assumes that 
everything can be made present-at-hand. 
Dahlstrom's critique of Heidegger is that he cannot present 
the ecstatically-horizonal timeliness without construing it as present-
at-hand. For Dahlstrom, this means it must conform to the de-
mands of formal logic and proper communication for it to be grasped 
as timeliness and not something else. Hence, although Heidegger 
provides an effective argument against the logical prejudice and 
the concept of truth that is a consequence of it, he nevertheless 
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fails to account adequately for the self-reflexive issues at work in 
his analysis. Dahlstrom sees Heidegger as failing to give a suffi-
cient account of the governing principles in Being and Time and 
the Marburg lectures. In addition, and not in a wholly unrelated 
way, Dahlstrom faults Heidegger for his flirting "with a suspension 
of the principle of noncontradiction" (446). Despite these issues 
within Heidegger's analysis, which Dahlstrom finds problematic, 
we are left with his support of Heidegger's argument for "the original 
phenomenon of truth" (as disclosedness) and its effective critique 
of the logical prejudice: "[E] ven if these objections [i.e. Heidegger's 
self-reflexivity and failure to provide a ground for the principles 
within his analysis] are conceded and Heidegger's own criticism 
of his early work is accepted, they do not entail the failure of his 
account of the 'original phenomena of truth'—and consequent 
exposure of the logical prejudice" (455). 
Although one might agree with Dahlstrom concerning the le-
gitimacy of Heidegger's concept of truth and corresponding criti-
cism of the logical prejudice, one might wonder if it is appropriate 
to be so dependent on classical logical models as a means of criti-
cizing some of Heidegger's insights. Dahlstrom states, "The logi-
cal prejudice is one thing, the principle of bivalence another. Ad-
herence to the law of excluded middle for all nonvague assertions 
is not tantamount to an endorsement of the assumption that truth is 
exclusively the property of a proposition, nor does acceptance of 
that logical principle amount to a presumption of the ontological 
status of the state of affairs depicted by a true proposition" (446-
447). And again, "...the principles of formal [i.e. classical] logic 
guarantee the possibility of communication... .Flaunting the prin-
ciples of logic or maintaining that they can be suspended at some 
level (even in regard to a manner of being, a disclosing, that they 
allegedly presuppose) spells the doom of communication, of au-
thentic talk among those who are-here" (448). 
Perhaps the self-reflexive problems in Heidegger's analysis 
are the very reason why one should question the legitimacy of 
classical logic in addressing the complexities of truth and Dasein. 
One way to re-emphasize the early Heidegger's point is that even 
our systems of logic must defer to Dasein's disclosedness. Is logic 
not itself dependent on the formal indication that Heidegger speaks 
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of? Dahlstrom is not nearly radical enough in allowing Heidegger's 
analysis of the prejudices of classical logic to reach its full poten-
tial. Is it really the case that communication and "authentic talk" 
are "doomed" if the laws of excluded middle and noncontradiction 
are not given infallible authority over every propositional evalua-
tion? Heidegger need not reject these laws in every case, only 
some (e.g. self-reflexive propositions, discussions of being and 
nothing, etc.). It is simply another form of the logical prejudice to 
assume that such things as the law of excluded middle or law of 
noncontradiction hold in all cases. Again, examples abound where 
these laws conflict with what is disclosed in Dasein (see Kant, 
Hegel, Fichte, and Heidegger himself for starters; their metaphysi-
cal works thrive on presenting antinomies that the laws of excluded 
middle and noncontradiction cannot account for). In support of 
such ideas, it is worth noting that much research has been done in 
the past fifty years supporting the legitimacy of non-classical log-
ics (the most impressive being the work of Graham Priest). This 
research might in fact reveal more of the genius at work in 
Heidegger's critique of the logical prejudice. Then again, there are 
always the party lines to consider ("but we don't do logic—they 
do"). In the end, although Dahlstrom provides an overall commend-
able work for those interested in the early Heidegger's concept of 
truth, his own final critique remains trapped within the very preju-
dice that is thematically criticized throughout the book; i.e. 
Heidegger's (all too?) effective critique of the logical prejudice. 
Joseph E. Steineger IV 
University of Kansas 
